Some General Thoughts on Defending Spread Tempo Offenses

Well, now that the bowl season is finally over, and I have almost completely overdosed on watching games, I must say I do have some thoughts on what I have seen defensively.  Now mind you, this is purely observational, and not stitch of what I'm talking about or illustrating has been confirmed with film, so basically this post is me bullshitting with you over a couple of beers at the local pub.  Now that we got that out of the way, let's look at my thoughts on what I viewed over the bowl season.

1. There is no, and will never be any, substitute for fundamentals.  The teams that did the best job on defense not only tackled well, but tackled well in space.  They fought off blocks, reacted well to schemes, made reads and utilized very good footwork and technique.  The biggest skills by far is coverage footwork and transition and tackling.  
1. Tackling- The spread schemes have an inordinate amount of ways to get players out-leveraged, out-flanked, and just generally in a bad position to defend whatever play is being run at them.  The packaged plays concept, along with multiple formations, reads and options being utilized has made many a great athlete look silly whiffing at air.  Good teams tackle, but great teams tackle with a purpose...EVEN IN JANUARY.  I don't give a damn what time of year it is, you must tackle.  I do tackling drills everyday during the season up until about games five or six, then I taper off, but even if I'm in the playoffs we are tackling once a week and still doing form/fit drills everyday.  The hardest thing to recreate as a defensive coach is open field tackling, but it MUST be done if facing these types of offenses on a regular basis.
2. Coverage footwork- The good teams have not just had spectacular athletes in the secondary, they've had great technicians in the secondary.  A DB has got to be a master at his craft.  This was no more evident in the BCS National Championship Game where Chris Davis in the beginning of the game used poor footwork on underneath routes to allow a couple of easy first downs.  Later, Davis (yes, I'm being critical of him) made huge error in the way he played the ball, receiver and the route on the pass interference call that led to him making the most critical error of the game (which had nothing to do with fundamentals).  On the goal line, playing in man coverage Davis aligns head up, yes HEAD UP on Kelvin Benjamin and allowed the big 6'5" receiver to body him up on a slant route in the end zone for the game winning touchdown.  Facing spread attacks requires that DB's have meticulous footwork and they must be able to play the ball in the air well.  This was never more evident than vs. one of the best defensive back coaches in the country than Nick Saban himself.  Saban's DB's time and time again found themselves in poor position because of poor technique.  Now, I will agree, there were some mismatches.  As one person put it, some teams just don't match up well against others.  May not mean one is better than the other, but the end result is the same.  The match up issues led to technique breakdown, and well, you see what you got.  The same could be said of Texas A&M's DB's or Baylor's.  
2. Schematically, I honestly feel man to man coverage HAS to make a major return to college football.  I know "living" in man, is not for the faint of heart, but even the match up zone coverage gurus are going the way of pure man on even their zone pressures.  Three-by-three zone blitzes are going back to the old grass roots man free blitzes of yesteryear, but with better eye control and leverage setup in the general attack of the blitz itself (blitzes must really be option centered now or spread option offenses can seriously gash your defense).  Man free and Cover Two Man have to make a comeback, at least until the time being.  I mean, hell, let's be honest, even Saban's version of Cover 3 (Rip/Liz) is basically man free.  Man to man cuts down on the amount of open grass receivers are allowed to attack, and not going pure cover zero all-out man allows you to have a match up problem with help over the top or trailing help underneath.  
3. Zone coverage is not dead however, but must be disguised, which leads me to my next point that the defenses intentions MUST be disguised.  From blitzes to stunts, to coverages, EVERYTHING must not appear as it seems.  The QB is not the only cat you have to fool either, the offensive lineman are the keys you must really fool.  I'm really surprised at the lack of amount of stemming you see defenses doing these days.  Stemming is easy and can be added to any call.  Regardless of tempo, most offenses at least take a second to look over the defense pre-snap, this is when you shift, then shift again.  Build in good hard fast rules too for when caught in a shift.  I always tell my guys when caught, keep working to your gap, don't stop and smell the roses and more importantly DON'T PANIC!!!  Disguise is a must because offenses have become so successful at reading a defenses' intentions and then changing the play, gashing the defense, aligning quickly and doing it again.  This disguise can help slow down the up-tempo schemes of today by making the offense have to reset or "re-audible".  

That moment when you realize this was a poor disguise...

1. More to elaborate on disguise, one thing I liked was how Missouri would show 1 high coverage, then rotate pre-snap to 2 deep, or even, rotate the deep safety down and down safety deep.  I was amazed watching a defender, aligned 5-6 yards off the ball, bailing before the snap to become the MOF defender.  Some of the coverages looked like zone, but some were also man free as well.  I thought the idea very ingenious because you rarely see one high, MOFC coverages morphing to two high, or better yet, rotating much in the way a four-spoke secondary would.  These types of adjustments must be made.  In other words, make the unordianry, ordinary.
1. Obviously pressure must be a consideration when facing these types of offenses.  I think pressure for pressure's sake is not a good mantra however.  I think you have to the standard stuff of evaluating protection schemes, QB strengths when pressured versus when not pressured, run pressures versus both gap and zone schemes etc.  The no huddle presents some issues with pressures in that they must be simple, so they can be signaled in quickly.  These pressure packages must be dynamic so they can adapt to the myriad of formations, shifts and motions that your players may see.  Making your pressure packages multiple, but simple is key.  A backside twist added to a field dog blitz is an easy adjustment, but must be communicated and taught as such.  I think being able to "tweak" a pressure with such nuances is very important in being able to give an offense multiple pressure looks throughout the course of the game.
2. Anti-pressure is another schematic theme that I think defensive coordinators, especially at the high school level should embrace.  Several years back I was facing a very good running QB, with some highly talented receivers (one is entering this year's NFL draft).  We had no answer in our base 4-3 package.  I stole an idea from good ol' Gus Malzahn and utilized a three man front where I simply changed out our 3 technique for another linebacker and played my traditional Mike linebacker about 8 yards deep so he could drop down the middle in a Tampa 2 look.  We went into that game with 4 pressures, 3 zone and 1 man.  We were a 24 point underdog and only lost by 11, confusing the hell out of our opponent with this look.  Now we ended up down by 21 at the half, because as the score got further out of hand, I kept bringing more and more pressure, which led to mistakes, and our players feeling like they needed to press.  In the second half, I called a man blitz, our safety slipped covering a dig route and we were down by 28.  After that I simply quit blitzing and dropped eight into coverage.  On the first possession they threw a pick that led to us scoring.  Second possession we forced the first punt of the night.  The less we pressured, the worse their QB played.  What was happening was we were reducing the size and number of windows this young man had to throw through.  What he began to do then was tuck and run when he got nervous about throwing a pick.  So we quit rushing our Nose, and let him and the stacked Tackle spy the QB.  This made things more and more frustrating leading to two more second half turnovers.  My point is this, don't always think you have to put the pressure on the QB by rushing him.  Sometimes it's better to put the pressure in front of him with coverage and a minimal rush.  I've actually done this more than once, and had it work quite well on more than one occasion.  I think DC's don't need to get caught up in drawing up these wide arrays of blitzes that send safeties and drop tackles etc. just for the sake of trying to sack the QB.  If you are having trouble getting to him, my answer would be, then make him have trouble finding anyone who is open.  What bigger waste of a player than having five offensive linemen blocking two or three defensive linemen, while the other eight or nine players are in coverage, confusing the QB?  I know it's contrarian, but think about it, once I made the leap, the dropping eight or nine has been a part of my spread defense package ever since.

3 man front 4-3 personnel Tampa 2 coverage

1. Also to note, this past season, because we had kids that were so new to doing what I was asking them to do, I kept it quite simple.  If we added a "drop" call to any coverage call, that told the tackle (three technique) to drop on passing plays to the low hole zone.  Allowed us to play coverage with our Mike linebacker a bit different, and also allowed us to play our quarters scheme with an extra underneath zone defender allowing the outside linebackers to get to the flats quicker.  Again, just thoughts on paper, but knowing some body's tried them and had success with them sure helps.  

Drop call given to 3 technique

1. Brophy had mentioned this before, but developing simple defensive concepts that can be communicated effectively and quickly are going to become more and more the norm in at least college football.  I think high school coaches have a bit of time on their side before we see the tempo of the college game, but it looms in the very near future.  None of this was more evident than when Alabama played Oklahoma.  Oklahoma, who throughout the year had done some tempo, wasn't anywhere near the Oregon's or Texas A&M's in terms of playing speed or number of plays, however with the break, and what Stoops knew about Saban's defense, they obviously worked on it and exploited it.  I may make a bold prediction here, but Saban's days may be numbered due to his inability to adapt.  He's had two years now of dealing with both Texas A&M and Ole Miss, both of which operate at high speeds and he's had trouble with these.  That's because Saban, like all of us, likes to be right.  Many a master craftsman wants his hands in everything, and it takes those of us who pride on using our minds to stop our opponent to a dark place when we have to rely only on fundamentals.  However, that is where the game is headed.  Fundamentals, who at some point in the collegiate game had taken a back seat to scheme, will now prevail (as it should).  If Saban doesn't adapt, as other college coaches, it could get ugly for them and ugly in a hurry (no pun intended).  Saban himself, along with Will Muschamp have already talked about scrapping their time eating offenses for the more glamorous no huddle, speed-in-space, up-tempo offenses.  
1. Where this takes defenses is they are going to have to educate the signal callers on the field even more so than before.  The signal callers are going to have to work in a way that they are essentially the coordinator on the field and get the defense in the right front and coverage in a very short amount of time.  The problem with this, as with defensive football in general is that it is reactive, where the offense is proactive.  Sure they have to snap the ball, but even if they aren't right all the time, a short throw to a great athlete that's well covered can still turn into six points.  The defense has this to worry about, and then having said short throw (could be a run, just using the short throw as an example), NOT be covered due to a bad pre-snap read, and it also turns into six.  This is where the teaching responsibility lies with the coordinators and their ability to put their scheme inside the head of a 20 year old.  In the case of high school, sometimes that guy may only be 15!  

What I drew on a napkin from Missouri game, no DVR, so may not be 100% accurate, but you get the gist.  

These are just some of my general notes I've basically jotted down in my phone, or on a napkin as bowl season unraveled before our eyes this season.  I think we could easily be five to six years off before defenses really "catch up", and I use that term lightly because defensive football is behind the eight ball already as the game is designed to be entertaining, and a nine to seven ballgame isn't really appealing to the average fan.  I also agree with Brophy on his new standards of measuring what a good defensive outing will be in the near future.  I think the time is gone where you see shutouts, or very low scoring affairs.  For those of us who are "defensive minded" this may be an issue, but it's like anything else, you either adapt, or you die.  

I'm thinking very seriously about working on a collaborative effort to look at this more closely.  I have contacted a couple of other bloggers about this, as I think it was our readers would want, and could greatly use.  If you have any suggestions or comments, shoot me an email or hit me up on Twitter @FootballIsLifeBlog.  Hope everyone had a great holiday, and is ready to hit the off-season in full stride!

Duece

Creating an Eight Man Front to Defend the Spread Offense III

In the first post I touched on various ways that one-high (MOFC) coverages can be utilized in a sound manner to defend the spread offense.  The second post touched on some adjustments you can make via the front and the coverage to attack certain things the offense is attempting to do.  Now, I want to touch on a couple of the finer points of the eight man front such as:

• The Free Safety (FS) and his role in MOFC coverage in the eight man front.
• Simplifying alignment in the eight man front.
• Blitzing in the eight man front.

The Free Safety's Role in MOFC Coverage
The FS in most MOFC defenses has a tough job, especially if the coverage is cover one, or some sort of two-deep rotational coverage.  Robber, and Cover One are not too strenuous on the FS, the reason being, in Robber the FS is pattern reading, and it's basically man, and in Cover One, the FS is free to roam based on the QB's eyes.  However, introduce Rip/Liz Cover Three and you now have the best of both Cover Three and Cover One.  Let's look at the pros cons of each and then display them with Rip/Liz and see what we get...shall we?

Cover One-Pros

• Aligns to and covers virtually everything with guaranteed MOF help.
• Simple, cover your man, run with your man if he goes in motion (you can bump, or motion blitz if you'd like, but again, this is simple man-to-man defense here).
• Provides a stable defense for the MOF, having both a MOF deep player and a MOF shallow player (Rat-in-the-hole). 
• Affords sending up to six defenders on a blitz if using peel coverage rules.

Cover One-Cons

• Run force-the force defender can be "run off" by a receiver he's supposed to cover man-to-man (although catch man alleviates some of this, it is still, nevertheless worrisome).
• Not all 11 eyes on the football.  Zone defense affords 11 eyes watching the football, whereas man defenders cannot always eye the football for the threat of being beaten in pass coverage.
• Outside 1/3's vulnerable to match up issues.  Corners are on an island in Cover One.
• Suspect to picks and rubs, as is any man-to-man defense.
• FS must have very good range.

Cover Three-Pros

• Aligns to everything.
• Very simple to install (should be able to do this in one practice).
• Good run support (dedicated force players at or near the LOS with a solid MOF alley player).

Cover Three- Cons

• Covers nothing.
• Weak in the seams.
• Weak in the curl.
• Weak against flood routes.
• Every offense in the country has several "Cover Three Beaters" installed in their offense day one (which means EVERYONE's seen it).
• FS has to have excellent range.

By utilizing Saban's Cover Three, you end up with the following:

Rip/Liz-Pros

• Aligns to everything.
• Excellent MOF defense with a MOF safety deep and MOF underneath player (ROBOT).
• Can keep same rules for zone blitzing (Number one and two droppers are identical in both Cover Three Rip/Liz and most three deep, three under zone blitz schemes), which alleviates teaching time(multiplicity through simplicity).
• Force players not as apt to be run off by receivers.
• All 11 eyes are on the football at the snap.
• No need to worry about picks and rubs (you're not in man-can run banjo schemes).
• With flat players funneling the number two receiver inside the hash, FS doesn't need to be as "rangy".
• Has the same run support structure as "Country Cover Three".
• Very strong in the seams and curl areas because of the pattern read.
• Works against most "Cover Three Beaters" and is hard for offense to distinguish between Cover Three and Cover One.

Rip/Liz-Cons

• Not as easy an install as "Country Cover Three" or Cover One, due to the pattern reading nature.
• Force players can still be run off somewhat, providing for a "soft edge".
• Corners are still on an island (match up).

Whew!  I know there are some more, but these are just the basics.  What you can see here is you get a lot of bang for your buck with Rip/Liz.  You can still run some Cover One if you need to and it's a great disguise for when you do.  You also can zone blitz from the one-high look and don't have to afford any pre-snap rotation to give away what you are doing (which many QB's are being taught for what to look for pre-snap nowadays). 

The biggest benefit I think is the protection of the seams, and the fact that the FS doesn't have to be a guy that can cover a TON of ground. Sure he has to be able to move, and read on the run, but he doesn't need to be a Major Wright!  The funneling of the number two receivers also helps the FS in the run game.  The FS can get a clearer read because the number two receiver is being pressed and thereby has to make his intentions pretty quickly (am I blocking or running a route) so the FS can get into his run/pass read quicker and is thereby a little better factor against the run than a traditional Cover Three FS.

So, we can see, the addition of a pattern reading Cover Three is the top priority if you are an eight man front and you want to consistently defend what spread teams will do to attack you.  It does not hurt to mix in some Cover One however, which will keep the opposing coach guessing and off track when trying to call certain plays.

Simplifying Alignment in the Eight Man Front
The eight man front is one of the easiest of all defenses to align.   The reason is, it's balanced with five defenders on each side of the ball and a MOF safety.  The thing I recommend, is to take a page out of our split field concept brethern's playbook and play field and boundary.  Let's look at the alignment shown below and I'll explain.

I chose the 3-3 defense for it's simplicity, but you can use the 4-4, 4-2, 5-3 or whatever eight man front you run out there.  However, the simplicity is that the Strong Safety (SS), who is usually the better of the two overhang safeties always goes to the field.  The WS (B in the illustration), would be the weaker of the two, and would be set to the boundary.  In most 3-3's I've seen, most coaches utilize right and left defenders which is super simple.  However, if you wanted to, you can easily set your strength to the field and still be quite sound.  Putting your best players to the field is not a bad idea either.  Here is how the 4-2-5 would align to the same look using field/boundary alignments.

Again, the defenders on the right side of the image are the strong side defenders, and are probably your better football players whereas your lesser player play into the boundary and are on the left side of the illustration above.

The simplicity of aligning the eight man front, affords your players one less thought that must tumble through their testosterone laden minds during the course of a game.  This lack of thinking keeps these players comfortable and playing exactly how we want them to...FAST.

Blitzing in the Eight Man Front
For years most folks new me as a Miami 4-3 guy, and to this day I still love that defense.  The one trouble I always had though, was blitzing out of it.  It may have just been me, but having been introduced to the TCU blitz scheme and after studying tons of 3-3 playbooks over the past few months, I can see there is no simpler front to blitz from than the eight man front.  Again, the balance affords simplicity in alignment, so teams have trouble getting you out of your base alignment.  What this does is affords for less of a chance that a blitzer will have to widen with an adjustment and thereby be caught out of position on the snap of the football.  The "six-in-the-box" concept keeps blitzing simple as well (both the 3-3 and 4-2, as well as some 4-3's keep this principle as well).  What I will show you, is some blitzes I used out of TCU's playbook, that despite us being a MOFC defense, we were still able to execute.



Bullets Away, my favorite!



Smokes

Strong/Wide Dog



Weak/Short Dog



Mob (cop)

As you can see, quite simple really.  All the blitzes listed in TCU's playbook can be run with the same adjustments and calls that TCU uses.  You don't have to limit yourself there either, the 3-3 defense has a myriad of blitzes that can be run from a MOFC defense.  Whatever front you choose to run, will find blitzing is quite easy and not too terribly taxing either.  Another "cheap" blitz from the 4 man front is the zone blitz sending one LB.  The rules for coverage are very simple, with the number three dropper being the only one who really changes from the standard Rip/Liz coverage rules.




Sam "B"



• Corners- Deep 1/3, all of 1 vertical
• OSS- #2 dropper, all of 2 vertical and out.  2 shallow and inside squeeze to the 3 dropper.
• ILB- #3 dropper, cut all crossers.
• FS- Deep 1/3, all of 3 vertical.

There you go!  Very similar to standard Rip/Liz reads and assignments.  Again, this is multiplicity through simplicity, which is a time tested manner for being able to attack your opponent in multiple ways with very little teaching time. 

In conclusion, I think it is VERY possible to be a one-high, MOFC defense and succeed against today's spread attacks.  I think there are multiple reasons for doing so, from anything to poor match ups or solving tricky alignment problems to being able to bring pressure without having to roll coverage are just some of the numerous benefits you get from staying one-high.  Hopefully you've been able to use this and can couple this with some other things I've posted on the site to have a very successful defense in the near future. 

Don't forget to check my other blog, The 12th Man, and as usual you can follow me on Twitter @theduece02. 

Duece

Creating an Eight Man Front to Defend the Spread Offense-II

The drink of all eight man front coaches!

In the first post, I gave you a brief history on the defense my staff and I developed out of the 4-2-5  personnel to defend a schedule, heavily laden with spread offenses.  In this post, I'm going to talk about our match up issues and what we did to alleviate these issues to help with being able to compete against vastly superior athletes.  Now this isn't to say we were successful, however, the ideas that were learned through a season of innovation, I think, are worth sharing.

Force Issues
Rip/Liz cover three is a great adaptation to defending the spread offense, but does have one drawback, and that is that your force player is responsible for the vertical of the number two receiver.  But Duece, that's no different than in any Quarters coverage scheme, so what's the big deal???  The big deal is the Quarters coverage force player is doing this from a depth of eight to 12 yards.  In the eight man front, with a one high safety look, these players are doing their job from an invert depth of five yards off the LOS.  This means that these players, must make their reads very quickly.  The other issue, is that the outside safeties (OSS's) must align in outside leverage on the number two receiver, which means they can be out leveraged to be able to engage in their role as the force player.




SS has a long way to go to force the ball, but must also handle the vertical of #2




The way my staff and I handled this issue, was in a couple of ways.  The first thing we did was not to change anything but the way our defensive line (DL) would play, a topic that we've already talked about, the Two-Gap/One-Gap scheme better known as TGOG.  We would set the three technique to the field, so that the DE to the field side would be a one-gap player, thereby having him come up field hard and "box in" the play. 

This technique serves us well on inside runs that spill outside, however, the jet sweep killed it, and we had to do something else.  I looked high and low, and came up with two solutions, the first was to align the tackles in double 2I techniques, and the ends in five techniques.  Utilizing TGOG principles, this meant the tackles were one gap players and the DE's were two gap players.  By doing this, we were able to move our LB's out to a "hip" alignment stacked behind the DE's which allowed them to "fit" better on outside run plays. 

Now even though the LB is not the force player, by making taking away any reads he has and forcing his "flow to" read to be an automatic C gap fit, the offense is not in a position to block this player very well.  Even if they lead the back, the LB will allow the WS (in the diagram above) to get his read, come off any block that may occur and force.  Ok, I know, what the heck do you do with the inside run game, as those B gaps sure to look inviting.  Remember, utilizing the TGOG principle, makes things seem as though they aren't!

Another thing we did to add confusion was the 3-3 stack front talked about earlier, and we simply had the DE's play the two gap responsiblility and had the two tackles attack the A gaps in tandem based on our call. 

As you can see, the idea was to alleviate the immediate pressure on the force player by putting the LB's in a position to support the C gap immediately.  However, our defense against the run was less than successful that season.  It was not the outside run that hurt us as much as the inside run, and it had little to do with scheme, as we once again saw a weakness in our match ups.  Teams really hurt us with a good running quarterback and running isolation and power run plays.  Desperately seeking a solution, one presented itself via the Huey board in the form of an old defense, made popular by Buddy Ryan...yep, the 46!

Defending the Inside Run
Now, the 46 Nickel was something that was born out of this, but how I actually got in the 46 was very interesting.  At first, the idea was to simply have the tackles align in three techniques and be one gap players as well as letting the DE's align in wide nine techniques and also play a one-gap technique.  The strong side LB would walk down and stand over the nose while the weak side LB stacked behind as shown below:

We did several things out of this.  The first was have the Sam read the hat of the center, and go to the opposite A gap if the center tried to cut him off.    This allowed the Mike to scrape to the play, virtually unblocked.  Coverage wise, the Sam would always drop to the short side of the field if he got a high hat read, and Mike would drop to the wide side of the field.  If the ball was in the MOF, then the Sam dropped left and the Mike to the right.

The other great thing about this was we could rush the Sam, play cover six (three deep three under fire zone) and have the Mike be the three dropper quite easily.  Another less expected result was to bring the Mike, and drop the Sam, all the while playing a fire zone coverage behind it.

Sam rushed based on call (strong/weak/right/left), Mike responsible for A gap away from call

Bringing Mike and dropping Sam yielded some good results!

The fire zone coverage was an easy install because relatively little changed for the underneath droppers.  The only changes were that to the weak side or the short side, these defenders would play pure man to man defense.  On the strong side, or wide side of the defense we used fire zone principles with a true number two dropper (SS) and a number three dropper (Mike/Sam-whoever dropped).  So the final outcome would look like the illustration below:

Because of our athleticism at DE, we eventually went pure cover one for simplicity's sake.  As you can clearly see, you can run the fire zone concept from this look quite easily. 

The three, zero, three alignment freed up our LB's to play the run so much better because it eliminated the double teams that are present when you leave two gaps open instead of one.  Once this was installed teams really struggled to run on us. We did give up some passes across the middle, and we began mixing in some cover one.  We could do this because of the wide DE's as we could use them to force now. 

A lot of folks would argue, "Duece you are no longer really a 4-2 anymore!", to which I would say, no we are, we just had to use some tricks to make things work better for us in areas where we did not match up very well.  I think this is the goal of any good coach, as the idea that you must "stick to the scheme" will eventually get you fired.  Adaptation and teaching are what are traits of all good football coaches.  This ability to "make the parts work" is essential in finding success.  For us, the schemes shown above took a defense that was giving up an average of 450 yards per game of total offense and allowed us to reduce that number to around 240 yards per game.  Still not great, but the schemes helped to stop the bleeding.  I know, scheme isn't everything, but when you are teaching the players correctly, and their God given abilities are failing them, you have to try to find ways around these deficiencies to try and find success.  These schemes did just that.

In the last post, I'm going to discuss the role of the free safety (FS) in making the eight man front successful against the spread.  I hope you find these post insightful as you do your off season homework.  Remember champions are not made overnight!


Duece

Creating an Eight Man Front to Defend the Spread Offense

Did someone say eight man front?

When I first went to the 4-2-5, my team struggled to grasp the concept, but it wasn't just the concept alone that hurt us.  There are some glaring weaknesses in the "Pattersonian 4-2" that if you are "out-athleted", you simply are setting yourself up for failure.  I will explain further, but after some miserable seven-on-seven outings, I had to do something.  Well, what I'm going to present you is what I came up with, and a bit of it was stolen from our 3-3 brethren, as well as from Brophy's blog on Nick Saban's adaptation of Cover 3 to the spread offense.

I was forced into the 4-2, because like a lot of coaches in struggling situations, we needed answers which correlated to wins.  Now, this story doesn't have a happy ending, however, there are some excellent things to be learned from the trials and tribulations of ANY coach.  So when the switch was made, things looked good on paper, then enter the seven-on-seven league we played in.  Where we got hurt the most was in the curl area to the away side of the coverage.  Blue is a great coverage, however to the away side, you are essentially giving up the curl, and if you play Bronco, you are giving up that out route to the flat due to the leverage issue of the Weak Safety (WS).  Well, after four disappointing games, and four weeks of not seeing any progress, I became enamored with finding a solution.  I needed something simple and quick to install.  Well, I found my answer on the pages of Cripes, Get Back to Fundamentals in the posts on Saban's Rip/Liz adaptation.  So, the following Monday we installed Cover 3, and Mable, and went on to look a whole lot better in seven-on-seven.  After losing our first four games, we ended up winning three out of the last four, to finish three and five for the summer.  The kids liked the new coverage better and I just knew we were going to succeed.  Well, enter the pre-season!

Prior to the start of the season, the goal was to keep the defense simple so the kids could play fast.  Well, our base coverage to any 2 back set was Robber, and then if we got any one back set, we moved on Cover 3.  Trips check would be Mable, and we were going to blitz empty if we got it (we only saw empty five times that year, even though we played seven spread teams).  What I'm going to do in the following paragraphs is explain the coverages we used, and then go through the "rights" and "wrongs" that we did so you can see how we came to an end result which was an eight man front that was sound against the spread. 

Robber
Robber coverage is nothing new, and since I was a Quarters guy, it fit with my mentality of pattern reading.  Trouble is, we only faced two, two back teams that year, and both were at the end of the season.  Sure, we saw some mix of some spread two back, but not much, so Robber was no the first coverage I taught.  Now, the Robber I ran, was the typical Virginia Tech Robber scheme that so many people have become familiar with over the years.  There's been so much written on the topic that for me to write more, would simply fall into the category of "white noise" as there is very little I can bring to the table on the subject that hasn't already been written about.

Cover Three
Cover three, has also been written about a lot, and most know, by now, the links to Brophy's site where he speaks about Saban's adaptation to this age old fundamental coverage.  Most who really know me, know I can't stand cover three.  Anyhow, after reading the beautifully written pages of Brophy's blog I was hooked.  Saban's cover three is everything you love about cover one, and everything you love about cover three, all rolled into one.  I heard one person even comment to Brophy that Saban's cover three was much like a one-high version of Quarters.  This comment really caught my attention, and got my wheels to spinning.  I'm going to re-hash the rules for Saban's cover three, in case anyone missed them.

For the corners, Rip/Liz (what Saban calls his adaptation), is basically like cover one with some zone principles.  The corner's rule is he has all of the number one receiver vertical.  If one is shallow and in or out, he zones off his deep third.  Pretty standard, yet vague enough of a description to be dangerous.  What I added to this to help our corners was to put in a depth of the route, and more specifically a time. If the corner was able to count to three after the snap and the receiver was still running vertical, then he locked on to him man to man (ala cover one).  If the receiver had made a break before this, then the corner would zone off into his deep third.  This gave the corner a feel for the three step game, since you can roughly count to three and be at the third step of the quarterback, and allowed the corner to anticipate whether he was getting a three or five step drop ( I can't tell you the last time I've seen a seven step drop in high school football).  Anyhow, that was really the basis for the coverage for the corners.  Now I did tweak one thing, that if the number one receiver broke off his route in a hitch or out, that the corner could cushion back and think smash and help play under the deep corner route.  This technique helped our outside safeties (OSS) who were sometimes a little outmatched by the opponent's slot receiver.  Ok, speaking of the OSS's, let's move on to their reads and techniques.



Corner reads

The OSS's rules for Rip/Liz were that they were to take the vertical and out by the number two receiver.  Here I had to tweak the term "vertical" a bit more as well.  What I found out worked for us, was that if the receiver took two steps up field, he was vertical.  I know this is slightly different than the corners, but had to be done this way to combat some of the spacing concepts such as all hitches or all slants.  This allowed us to play the short throws much like cover one would, in a basic man-to-man concept.  The OSS was to align in outside leverage so long as he did not cross the top of the numbers if the ball was in the MOF.  This allowed the OSS to maintain leverage on his run assignment of playing force.  If the number two receiver went shallow and inside, then the OSS would break immediately to the flat based on the corners call of what the number one receiver had done (in or out).  If the call was out, the OSS would flatten his drop and look to get in the "window" of the quarterback's vision.  If the call was in, the OSS would "sit down" and hang on the edge of the curl/flat zone boundary line looking for the slant or dig routes.  Again, we can see, Saban's adaptation has taken two of cover three's known weaknesses, the seams, and the curl flat divider and removed them from existence. 

OSS reads/reactions to number two vertical or out

The free safety had the very simple rule of playing the middle third of the field.  What I liked about the coverage is it took a huge strain off the free safety playing those seam routes against four vertical teams.  The free safety did not have to be such a good athlete as a typical MOF safety does, which was our case. 

So, in summary, the Rip/Liz adaptation really helped, and this help immediately showed in seven-on-seven.  However, like anything else, this adaptation had it's disadvantages too, which I will speak of later. 

Video Courtesy of our main man Brophy

Mable
Mable, which is Saban's adaptation of cover three to defend trips, is a very sound way of playing any three by one set you may see.  However, one weakness that stood out in seven-on-seven was that by pushing the linebacker to the trips, he was barely in the box, and really was asking a tall order of one of my inside linebackers to do what his rules were.  The rules are simple, but my adaptation was shown below, in what a friend of mine (Outlaw Josey Wales on the Huey board) called "dogs over".  This concept was one of many I borrowed from the 3-3 Stack guys, and it was simply to move the weak OSS over to the trips side and slide the linebackers one full shade to the weak side of the coverage.  This did two things, first it put our linebacker in man coverage in a situation with a better match up, our linebacker against their running back (which was much better than our linebacker against their number three receiver).  Second, by sliding the linebackers away, and utilizing our Two-Gap/One-Gap defensive line play, we were able to use this weak side linebacker as our force player.  Thirdly, this scheme, which I aptly named "30 backer" (cover three strong and cover zero weak with weak backer force) put our three better athletes on our opponent's three receivers creating the match ups that we wanted. 

"Dogs over" adjustment to trips in the 3-3 stack



"Dogs over" adjustment in the 4-2



Mable's reads are not that tough, and is nothing more than an overloaded zone pushed to the strong side with a man to man concept on the backside.  This is nothing new, and Brophy has detailed this quite a bit in his posts on Mable.  The key to Mable is that the two underneath droppers (the strong and weak safeties) have got to get the number two or number three receiver on a different level if the offense is running four verticals.  Fortunately for us, we didn't see four verticals from trips, and even though we worked the dickens out of it, this concept still concerned me. 

Coverage Summary
As you can see, that is a very simple and small list of coverages.  Much smaller than the standard TCU fare I've talked about in the past.  I'm not knocking TCU, I'm just saying, that it does require some athletes at certain positions to run.  If you don't have these athletes, you don't scrap the defense (although some would), you make the defense fit what you have.  Saban's adaptations have made this possible.  The ability to play an eight man front against spread teams, and especially the spread option teams has been a huge victory for defenses around the country fighting to keep up with spread football.  Sure, are there weaknesses, yes there are, and I will talk about those in the next post.  I'm going to cut this one up into a few posts, so hang in there, these should be some informative posts to those who don't have the athletes to run some of the seven man front coverage schemes!

Duece